Formal methods for software development have made great strides in the last two decades, to the point that their application in safety-critical embedded software is an undeniable success. Their extension to non-critical software is one of the notable forthcoming challenges. For example, C programmers regularly use inline assembly for low-level optimizations and system primitives. This usually results in driving state-of-the-art formal analyzers developed for C ineffective. We thus propose TInA, an automated, generic, trustable and verificationoriented lifting technique turning inline assembly into semantically equivalent C code, in order to take advantage of existing C analyzers. Extensive experiments on real-world C code with inline assembly (including GMP and ffmpeg) show the feasibility and benefits of TInA.
Introduction
Context. Formal methods for the development of highsafety software have made tremendous progress over the last two decades [3, 15, 27, 33, 39, 48] , with notable success in regulated safety-critical industrial areas such as avionics, railway or energy. Yet, the application of formal methods to more usual (non-regulated) software, for safety or security, currently remains a scientific challenge. In particular, extending the applicability from a world with strict coding guidelines and disciplined mandatory validation processes to more liberal and diverse development and coding practices is a difficult task.
Problem. We consider here the issue of analyzing "mixed code", focusing on the use of inline assembly in C/C ++ arXiv, Mars, 2019 , Cornell University 2019 code. This feature allows to embed assembly instructions in C/C ++ programs. It is supported by major C/C ++ compilers like GCC, clang or Visual Studio, and used quite regularly -usually for optimization or to access system-level features hidden by the host language. For example, we estimate that 11% of Debian packages written in C/C++ directly or indirectly depends on inline assembly, with chunks containing up to 500 instructions, while 28% of the top rated C projects on GitHub contains inline assembly according to Rigger et al. [53] . As a matter of fact, inline assembly is a common engineering practice in key areas such as cryptography, multimedia or drivers. However, it is not supported by current stateof-the-art C/C ++ program analyzers, like KLEE [15] or Frama-C [39] , possibly leading to incorrect or incomplete results. This is a clear applicability issue for advanced code analysis techniques.
Given that developing dedicated analyzers from scratch is too costly, the usual way of dealing with assembly chunks is to write either equivalent host code (e.g, C/C ++ ) or equivalent logical specification when available. But this task is handled manually in both cases, precluding regular analysis of large code bases: manual translation is indeed time-consuming but also error-prone. The bigger the assembly chunks are, the bigger these problems loom.
Goal and challenge. We address the challenge of designing and developing an automated, generic, trustable, and verification-oriented lifting technique turning inline assembly into semantically equivalent C code. Such a method should be:
Widely applicable It should not be tied to a particular architecture, assembly dialect or compiler chain, while still handling a significant subset of assembly chunks found in the wild;
Provably correct The translation process should maintain exactly all possible behaviors of the mixed code and also provide a way to show this property;
Verification-friendly The translation should strive to be agnostic w.r.t. verification techniques (e.g., symbolic execution [38] , deductive verification [32, 34] or abstract interpretation [24] ), while allowing decent enough analyses in practice (informally dubbed verifiability).
Scarce previous attempts do not fulfill all these objectives. Vx86 [42] is tied to both the x86 architecture and deductive verification, while the recent work by Corteggiani et al. [23] focuses on symbolic execution. None of them addresses verifiability and provable correctness. At first sight, decompilation techniques [19] [20] [21] may seem well suited to the goal at hand. Yet, as they mostly aim at helping reverse engineers, correctness is not their main concern. Actually, "existing decompilers frequently produce decompilation that fails to achieve full functional equivalence with the original program" [57] . A few recent works target this issue [12, 57] , yet Schwartz et al. [12] do not study whether the produced code is amenable to verification and do not demonstrate correctness (though measuring a certain degree of it via high-coverage testing), while Schulte et al. [57] use a correct-by-design but possibly non-terminating search-based method and do not explore verifiability.
Proposal. We propose TInA (Taming Inline Assembly), an automated, generic, trustable, and verification-oriented lifting technique turning inline assembly into equivalent C code. The main insight behind TInA is that by focusing on inline assembly rather than arbitrary decompilation, we tackle a problem both more restricted (simple control-flow, smaller size) and better defined (interfaces with C code, no dynamic jumps), paving the way to powerful targeted methods. TInA relies on the following key principles:
• Recent binary-code lifters [4, 11, 36] translating binary opcodes to generic low-level intermediate representations (IR) provide minimalist architectureagnostic and well-tested IRs adapted to our goal; • Trust can be earned through translation validation [47] (validating each translation) rather than translator validation (validating once the full translator), which is recognized as more tractable and reduce the trusting base to a (usually simpler) checker; • In our case, this checker requires to prove program equivalence -a notoriously hard problem 1 . We build a dedicated equivalence checking algorithm tailored to our processing chain -more tractable than full-blown program equivalence;
• Finally, verifiability is enhanced by dedicated passes refining the raw original IR with C-like abstractions, such as higher-level control-flow [29] or datatypes [45] .
Contributions. In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• a new cooperating toolchain allowing formal verification of programs mixing inline assembly and C (Sec. 4), based on an original combination of novel and existing components -including a method to lift inline assembly to properly refined high-level C (Sec. 5); • the automated validation of said method to make the lifter trustable, via a new dedicated program equivalence checking algorithm taking advantage of our transformation process to achieve both efficiency and high success rate (Sec. 6); • thorough experiments (Sec. 7) of a prototype implementation on real-world examples to show its wide applicability (all Debian GNU/Linux 8.11 x86 assembly chunks, and some ARM) and its positive impact on 3 different verification techniques on samples from GMP, ffmpeg, ALSA and libyuv.
Discussion. This work targets assembly chunks as found in real-world programs, and we are indeed able to lift and validate 74% of all assembly chunks from Linux Debian 8.11 (Table 1) and to benefit a range of state-ofthe-art verification techniques (Sec. 7.2). Still, system instructions and floating-point instructions are currently considered out-of-scope. Especially, floats are not tackled here since handling them well is a challenge in itself for the whole toolchain (lifter, solver, verifier) -see the extended discussion in Sec. 8.
Context and motivation
Consider the code snippet of Fig. 1a extracted from UDPCast sources. It consists of the x86 assembly code itself (here: "cld ;␣rep␣stosl ") together with a specification linking C variables to registers and declaring inputs, outputs and clobbers (i.e., registers or memory cells possibly modified by the assembly chunk). The compiler, upon encounter of such an (extended) assembly chunk, may use this specification -for example during register allocation. However, it is completely blind to the rest of the information (e.g., mnemonics) and will forward the chunk as is until code emission.
Example. The code in Fig. 1a is suffixed by a specification, written in a concise constraint language, in zones separated by ':' (lines 16-23):
• It first describes allocation constraints for output variables:
1 # 54 " / u s r / i n c l u d e / i 3 8 6 −l i n u x−gnu / s y s / s e l e c t . h " 2 t y p e d e f l o n g i n t __fd_mask ; 3 4 # 64 " / u s r / i n c l u d e / i 3 8 6 −l i n u x−gnu / s y s / s e l e c t . h " 5 t y p e d e f s t r u c t { 6 __fd_mask __fds_bits [ 1 0 2 4 / ( 8 * s i z e o f ( __fd_mask ) ) ] ; 7 } f d _ s e t ; 8 9 # 1074 " s o c k l i b . c " 10 i n t u d p c _ p r e p a r e F o r S e l e c t 11
( i n t * s o c k s , i n t nr , f d _ s e t * r e a d _ s e t ) 12 "0". "=c" (__d0) specifies that variable __d0 should be assigned to register ecx; "1". "=D"(__d1) specifies that variable __d1 should be assigned to register edi;
• Then, lines 20-22 detail inputs: "a" (eax) holds 0, sizeof (fd_set) / sizeof (__fd_mask) is held in the register described in "0" (ecx) and the one described in "1" (edi) holds &((read_set)−>__fds_bits)[0]; • Finally, the whole memory ("memory") can be assigned. This basically tells the compiler to flush its memory cache before entering the chunk.
Informal semantics. The code "cld ;␣rep␣stosl " has the following informal semantics: put the direction flag df to 0, then fill ecx double words from the edi pointer with the value from eax. Intel's manual [35] explains that df drives the sign of the increment: when df is 0, the sign is positive. TInA produces the code in Fig. 1b : the loop from the informal semantics is there, but the lifter optimized away (see Sec. 5.2) elements like cld or "a" (0).
Running the analyzers.
If we try to run C code analyzers on this code, we observe erratic behaviors: KLEE [15] stops with an error message; Frama-C, on the other hand, warns that 'Clobber list contains "memory" argument. Assuming no side-effect beyond those mentioned in output operands'.
This message is clear but the behavior incorrect: the keyword "memory" stipulates that all memory may be assigned but Frama-C simply ignores it. This small example shows that a single line of assembly may throw off these tools. Of course, one may manually rewrite the chunks into semantically equivalent C code, then use C analyzers, but this is not scalable and error-prone. With TInA, we are able to automatically generate Fig. 1b . The production of this code, illustrative of our code transformations (see Sec. 5), is automatically validated (Fig. 8) . We can then formally show with Frama-C [39] , using abstract interpretation or deductive verification, that the code indeed verifies the informal semantics laid out before.
Properties of inline assembly. TInA exploits the following properties, specific to inline assembly: P1. Its control flow structure is limited: only a handful of conditionals and loops, hosting up to hundreds of instructions; P2. The interface of the chunk with the C code is usually given: programmers annotate chunks with the description of its inputs, outputs and clobbers with respect to its C context; P3. Furthermore, the chunk appears in a C context, where the types, and possibly more, are known: this kind of information is sought after in decompilers, using heuristics, and we only need propagate it here. All in all, the above points show that lifting assembly chunks is actually an interesting sub-problem of general decompilation, both simpler and richer in information and thus significantly more amenable to overall success.
Background

Inline Assembly
We focus here on inline assembly in C/C ++ code as supported by GCC and clang. MASM (Microsoft Macro Assembler) has a different syntax but works similarly. Assembly chunks in the GAS syntax of GCC have two flavors: basic and (recommended) extended (see Fig. 2 ). Basic assembly (Fig. 2a) allows the insertion of assembly instructions anywhere in the code. They will be emitted as is during the production of the assembly file. In this case, compilers assume the chunk has no effect on its C scope, preventing safe interactions between assembly and C code -yet that does not stop developers from using it when the implicit context looks safe. In the example of Fig. 2a , it is implicitly assumed that no optimization will occur on globals a and b and that xmm registers are not used by default.
Extended assembly. Extended assembly allows in addition the description of the interactions with C through its inputs and outputs. It works like a printf string format, as shown in Fig. 2b : some assembly operands may be replaced by placeholders referring to a list of C operands.
The syntax requires binding C operands to location constraints, as in Fig. 1a and 2b. Constraints may also specify more than one location, and let the compiler choose the best way to place this operand. Common placement constraints include r to bind to a general register; m to bind to a memory address; i to an immediate value; and g which means "r, m or i".
Operands may be read-only (for inputs) or write-only (for outputs) with the = modifier. A read-write operand is created either by linking an input to the same location as an output ("0" ( sizeof (fd_set) / sizeof (__fd_mask)) in Fig. 1a) or by using the + modifier instead of =.
Without special modifiers, compilers assume read-only operands are consumed before write-only operands are produced, so that these may share the same locations.
In addition to the input-output list, one can declare a list of clobbers, usually registers whose value will be overwritten by the chunk, either to compute intermediate results or as a side effect of an instruction. The clobber list may also contain keywords like "memory" (arbitrary memory cells may be read and/or written) and "cc" (conditional flags will be changed).
The specification of inputs, outputs and clobbers stands as a contract between the chunk and the compiler. Compilers are totally blind to what actually happens inside the chunk, relying on the contract, and will not warn about mistakes inside the chunk. Forgetting to list an input or a clobber is an easy mistake that can result in code which does not behave as expected by the programmer.
The use of inline assembly is pretty widespreadwe estimate that 11% of Debian packages written in C/C++ directly or indirectly depends on inline assembly. It includes major projects like GMP and ffmpegRigger et al. [53] reports that 28% of the top rated C projects on GitHub uses inline assembly. In the chunks found in Debian Jessie 8.11 (used in Sec. 7.1) we estimate that 75% have an optimizing purpose, with an average size of approximately 10 instructions. Inline assembly is often used in conjunction with C macros or inlineable functions to be specialized by the compiler at each location.
Binary-code lifters
Binary-code lifters are the fundamental cornerstones of binary-level analyzers. They are used to abstract the different binary Instruction Set Architectures (ISA) and formats into a single intermediate representation (IR) [4, 11, 36] . We rely on the IR of Binsec [28] , called DBA -other IRs are similar. Its syntax is shown in Fig. 3 .
inst := lv ← e | goto e | if e then goto e else goto e lv := var | @[e] n e := cst | lv | unop e | binop e e | e ? e : e unop :
DBA is a minimalist language, comprising only two types of elements (bitvector values and memory) and three instructions: assignments, jumps and conditionals. Yet, this is enough to encode the functional semantics of major ISAs -including x86 and ARM.
Binary lifters provide specialized decoders for supported architectures, in the same spirit that a compiler has one code emitter per supported architecture. Lifters are then used in disassembly algorithms to (try to) recover the semantics of the binary program. We use them to disclose the semantics of compiled assembly chunks.
Taming Inline Assembly: an overview
TInA lifts inline assembly to semantically equivalent C taking advantage of properties P1-P3. The process consists of two phases: lifting and validation, detailed respectively in Sec. 5 and 6. But first, let us discuss the overall approach, as schematized in Fig. 4 .
Localization. The process starts by identifying C source code embedding inline assembly. We locate assembly chunks in this code, in order to inject the lifted code back into the correct place later on.
We also extract the specification of the assembly chunk (inputs, outputs and clobbers) as written by the programmer. This will be used to check the compliance of the assembly chunk with it. The specification also contains contextual information to link C variable names with register names (or memory locations) in our IR.
Compilation. We now compile the source code for the target architecture with debug information. Since we control code compilation, we choose to include all data that can help in reconstructing a C code, e.g., variable names and types from the context.
Lifting to IR.
We now start the translation per se. We lift the code back to the IR level, which will serve as the basis for simplifications and optimizations (Sec. 5.2). The use of binary code may seem gratuitous at first sight. This is however the best place to start working, since assembly chunks are totally instantiated and embedded in their context -register names and memory locations have been resolved by the compiler.
Lifting to C. Then we begin the lifting back to C itself, through a series of passes detailed in Sec. 5, engineered in the same vein as compilers. The end result is a C-only code where assembly chunks have been substituted by a lifted C code, ending the translation phase. We are now going to prove the semantic equivalence between the lifted code and its assembly chunk during validation.
Recompilation & Validation. The validation phase starts by recompiling the pure C code, without optimization in order to preserve the code structure -our validation technique depends on it. We locate the binary code corresponding to the lifted code once more, and get back its IR representation. We now possess two distinct IR pieces: this one and the one from the first compilation. We will aim to prove their semantic equivalence in Sec. 6.
Validation is key to the trust that one can have in TInA, and allows its integration into formal methods developed for C without endangering their soundness.
We have implemented a prototype of TInA leveraging existing tools, namely Frama-C [39] for C source code manipulation (parsing, localization, C injection), Binsec [26, 28] (lifting to DBA IR [4] , integration with SMT solvers [7] for bitvectors and arrays), and the DWARF [30] debug format to pass information to binaries with GCC.
Lifting from IR to C
The goal of the initial lifting phase is to recover wellstructured C code preserving the semantics of the original assembly chunk, in order to make it verifiable. This is made possible through the use of a series of passes which will simplify the low-level IR and massage it back to a readable C output.
Type verification and reconstruction
To lift assembly code back to C, chunk operations on bitvectors and memory need to be mapped to C operations on integers (signed/unsigned) and pointers.
To this end, we propagate types from the interface into the IR operations: IR types can either be addresses (typed pointers) or values (signed or unsigned, with an associated bit size). The type information is synthesized using the forward propagation and constraints imposed on operands by the low-level operations. Assembly operations are indeed allowed to transform types (lifted to C casts) but we check that pointers are never forged from non-pointer values. For instance, it is allowed to use a pointer as an unsigned value but not the converse. This step further guarantees that inputs' and outputs' types are respected. Upon lifting the type information of the chunk, the concrete C types are given using the type size information embedded in DWARF.
Optimizations
In order to get C code which does not hinder subsequent analyses, we strive to produce high-level C code hiding low-level details. To that effect, we use a series of (optional) passes of transformation at the IR level.
Register unpacking. Assembly chunks often contain optimizations exploiting data level parallelism, in order to use the full capacity of the hardware by packing multiple value inside a bigger one fitting inside a machine register. For instance, loading four (byte) characters inside an integer is more efficient than doing four smaller loads. The concept has been exacerbated with Single Instruction Multiple Data extensions, providing vectorized registers up to 512-bits, able to contain several independent values. Register unpacking will extract the values stored in a container to declare them as independent variables, thus preventing packed arithmetic from destroying the abstractions of the analyzers. Fig. 5 illustrates the difference on an example. The chunk loads two char in a register before adding them, using the h and l prefixes to (Fig. 5c) , making the code more complex than its clear initial intent (Fig. 5b) .
High-level predicate recovery. Low-level conditionals use flags -zero, sign, carry or overflow -set by previous instructions. In most situations, they have little meaning on their own and the way they are calculated makes understanding the purpose of the condition difficult. This pass reuses the technique of Djoudi et al. [29] based on semantic equivalence proved by SMT solvers. It substitutes the low-level condition, built on flags, by a more readable Boolean comparison. For example, this phase recovers if (ecx + 1 > 1) goto label ; instead of if ( zf == 0 && sf == of) goto label; from the assembly snippet "decl␣ecx;␣jg␣label ; ". Best-effort structuring. Even if the C syntax allows goto statements, their use is strongly discouraged for reasons of readability, and some analyzers may thus overlook their support. In an effort to avoid them, we aim to rebuild high-level control-flow structures such as loops or conditionals. This reconstruction actually has an impact on the efficiency of the next source code analyses. The rebuild aggregates the basic blocks composing the control-flow graph into meta-blocks, defined in a way similar to basic blocks: a meta-block [in, out[ has exactly one entry point in (included) and one exit point out (excluded). The control-flow graph is thus observed through nested scopes enabling the recovery of common patterns. The rules of inline assembly ensure that the whole chunk is itself a meta-block. Fig. 6 shows how the process works: it begins with the creation of meta-blocks
Once it is done, common patterns are tested on them.
Thus, a goes to I in a sequence, J and g form a loop, and b, c and K together a conditional diamond. In this example, the pattern inside the meta-block K comprising d, e and f will be written with goto statements to preserve the control-flow graph structure, as needed in Sec. 6.
Expression & constant propagation. We apply a well known compilation technique which improves readability by removing temporary variables. We equip it with a set of IR rewrite rules to significantly reduce the complexity of some expressions. Fig. 7 shows a favorable case computing the absolute value using bitwise tricks: in this example, rewrite rules first transform the extraction of the high bits of the signed extension into an expression, whose value is either all ones or zeros depending on the sign of eax. The xor operation is then distributed in the two branches where it is resolved as one's complement or identity. Finally, the last step subtracts two ternary expressions with syntactically equal conditions and thus, branches are distributed. The ones' complement incremented by one is a two's complement, ending up with the expected definition of absolute value.
cltd # sign extend eax in edx xor %edx, %eax # 1s-complement eax if eax < 0 sub %edx, %eax # add one to eax if eax < 0 Loop normalization. Predicting an incrementing or decrementing counter behavior in a loop is cheap but valuable information. This helps the analyzers in quickly bounding the number of iterations, increasing the precision in the loop body. This pass aims at syntactically highlighting the relations between the current iteration and the variable values. To do so, the self-incrementing (-decrementing) variables are normalized and merged together. For example, in Fig. 1b the byte-level affine relation between the counter ecx, lifted as __tina_ecx, and the moving pointer edi, based at __tina_4, has been found as edi ≡ __tina_4 + 4 × (__tina_3 − ecx) -the code has * (__tina_4 + (__tina_3 − __tina_ecx)), since __tina_4 is a long int (in x86, usually 4 bytes long) pointer.
Validation
As we want our method to be useful in a formal context, we take great care in ensuring that it does not add or remove behaviors from the written assembly chunk. In order for our translation to be trustable, we use a two-pronged approach: 1) We try to prove the semantic equivalence of the code prior to lifting with the lifted C code; 2) If this fails, we rely on intensive random testing to increase the level of trust in the lifted C code.
Block-based semantic equivalence. The lifting process of Sec. 5 strives to preserve the isomorphism of the controlflow graphs based on basic blocks between the initial assembly chunk and its lifted C representation over their DBA IR representation. This property allows us to tackle the equivalence proof at basic block level. The proof of equivalence proceeds as follows:
We check the isomorphism of the control-flow graphs extracted from the two lifted programs. Since we deal with deterministic labeled directed graphs, this check is immediate -and usually succeeds. TInA is actually very careful during optimizations and recompilation to preserve the control-flow structure. This is why we recompile without optimization. Our optimizations also take care to not modify jump instructions (except for dead branch elimination) so that the lifted C code is structurally identical in every alive location to the initial assembly chunk. To further ease the isomorphism check, we track the relation between the heads of IR basic blocks and the corresponding emitted C code. If the check succeeds, we go to S2, otherwise we fall back on random testing -in practice (Sec. 7.1), the latter has never happened. S2. Once we know the two control-flow graphs are isomorphic, we try to demonstrate the pairwise equivalence of corresponding vertices. This allows to avoid directly dealing with loops. Each pairing of basic blocks is translated to logical formulas for which we ask SMT solvers: if inputs are identical, can outputs be different? If all queries are unsatisfiable then equivalence is proven, otherwise we stop at the first failure and use our fallback. Fig. 8 shows the translation validation of the running example (Fig. 1) . Codes before and after lifting have the same shape (S1), as shown in (Fig. 8b) . The two blocks are obviously syntactically different, due to optimizations and recompilation. Compilation split complex expressions using general registers as temporary variable while the ones from B 2 have been lifted to C variables with a close but different name. For instance __tina_ecx is equal to ecx whereas eax is used differently in B 2 and B ′ 2 . Due to optimizing passes, the two blocks no more have the same number of inputs or outputs, because lifting inferred some constraints and removed unused variables. Thus, eax and df are actually 0 upon entering B 2 . As pointer edi is incremented by 4 while ecx is decremented by 1, the two variables are linked by the linear relation edi = tina_4 + 4 × (tina_3 − ecx). The formula is built to take into account these differences by adding logical assertions for each inferred constraint. In the end, the equivalence query is then discharged by a SMT solver. An (expected) unsat answer shows that there is no model such that the observable behaviors of the two basic blocks can differ.
in in
; outputs assertion memory out memory' out ∨ ecx out ecx' out ∨ edi out edi' out (b) Logical formula for the equivalence between B 2 and B ′ 2
Figure 8. Basic block equivalence
Fallback: basic fuzz testing. The equivalence proof may not work, even though we have not observed it in our experiments (Sec. 7). Graph isomorphism may have been lost, or the SMT solver may time out. To build more trust in this potential case, we rely on tests to look for differing outputs at the whole chunk level. We emulate both codes at the IR level, and generate random values for the inputs, discarding our translation whenever we find differing outputs. The level of trust we can achieve here can be controlled by the time spent testing, the number of generated tests, and the branch coverage achieved.
Trust base. We define our method as trustable since the user is not asked to trust the lifting process. Instead, to earn that trust, we rely on a practical and relevant process through translation validation, falling back on testing. Still, 3 components are part of the trust base: the binary-code lifter, the compiler and the solver.
The binary-code lifter is the first trusted element. Our process uses it twice, on different codes (control-flow structure is kept but instructions may differ, thus mostly avoiding common-mode errors) so some lifter errors can be caught during validation. The worst would be an error made during the initial IR lifting and propagated by the second, resulting in validating the translation of a code differing from the original inline assembly. Further mitigation, currently being put into place in Binsec for single mnemonics, include systematic testing of assembly chunks by executing both the code and its IR representation to check for discrepancies.
The compiler is the second trusted element, but only during the recompilation step. Indeed, the first compilation is known not to touch the assembly chunk but to compile as is -modulo register allocation. During the second one we trust that C semantics is preserved by compilation. We mitigate possible errors by using a low optimization level (-O0) to not trigger aggressive optimizations. Another possible (unimplemented) mitigation would make use of a second compiler (another version of the same compiler or another one altogether) and check for semantic equivalence at that level as well.
The solver is the third and final trusted element. Note that verification tools in Sec. 7.2 do likewise. SMT solvers are well tested software, but bugs can happen. We can mitigate those rare events the usual way, by sending the checks to multiple solvers (using the same SMT-LIB format) and look for possible differing outcomes.
Our fallback when validation does not work is based on random testing. While this is practical, high coverage is hard to achieve. A stronger fallback would consist in adapting known test generation methods and advanced coverage criteria, like MCDC, to build better trust. Yet, the success rate of our validation (100% lifted code is validated) indicates that this is not a real issue.
Experimental evaluation
We evaluate our implementation of TInA on 2 research questions: RQ1) How applicable is it on assembly chunks found in the wild? (Sec. 7.1) RQ2) How do off-the-shelf program analyzers behave on lifted code? (Sec. 7.2)
Wide applicability (RQ1)
We run our prototype on all assembly chunks found in the Linux Debian 8.11 distribution (for x86), i.e. ≈ 3000 chunks distributed over 200 packages and 1000 functions. As chunk distribution is not smooth, we also fix 2 subsets of samples: one with the 100 biggest chunks, and another with all chunks from 4 key major projects exploiting low-level optimizations: GMP, ffmpeg, ALSA and libyuv. Table 1 sums up the results of lifting with TInA.
We exclude trivial (empty or unused), out-of-scope and rejected chunks. Out-of-scope chunks include those with floating point operations, OS-level hardware instructions or hardware-based crypto-primitives, like AES. Rejected chunks are those deemed unsafe because they do not respect their interface. Yet, we activate options in our tool to specifically regard accessing flags, xmm registers or memory as safe -allowing to consider 150 extra chunks as relevant, notably in ffmpeg. The statistics of Table 1 report on the tool's behavior with these settings.
On in-scope chunks, TInA performs extremely well, with 100% chunks lifted and fully validated (no resort to testing) -this amounts to 74% of all found chunksfor a negligible cost ( Table 2 ). The biggest 100 chunks display of lower overall success percentage as they include a fair amount of (unhandled) floating-point instructions. TInA works as well on GMP for ARM as for x86, confirming the genericity of the method (Table 3 ).
Adequacy to formal verification tools (RQ2)
We select 3 tools representing popular families of formal techniques currently used in the industry: KLEE [15] for symbolic execution [16] (bug finding), and Frama-C [39] with its EVA plug-in [13] for abstract interpretation [24, 25] (runtime error verification) and WP plug-in [8] for deductive verification [32, 34] (functional correctness).
Experiments on both symbolic execution and abstract interpretation use 58 functions (out of 366) from the 4 key projects in Sec. 7.1, selected due to the ease of automatically generating the initial contexts for both analyses. For all 3 tools, we also report the observed differences using a basic lifter, without the optimizations of Sec. 5.2, and the full TInA approach.
Symbolic execution. We perform our experiments with KLEE [15] . As of today, this tool does not handle inline assembly chunks and stops when it meets one, this fact can sometimes prevent the adoption of symbolic execution [60] . (58/58) . The lifting strategy does not impact the functions that KLEE can now fully cover (25/58), but TInA considerably speeds up code exploration (w.r.t. basic lifting), enabling to cover significantly more paths (×4) in the same amount of time. This is explained by TInA-produced code being higherlevel: it contains fewer instructions and local variables (control-flow structure does not change). This translates to fewer memory load/stores, thereby accelerating SMTsolving.
Abstract interpretation. We use the Frama-C EVA [13] plug-in. Frama-C has limited support for inline assembly based on the interface of the chunk, through translating it into logical assigns annotations over modified variables -safely interpreted in EVA (and WP) as non deterministic assignments. Table 5 sums up the results. Code lifting almost always reduces the number of alarms in the common C code (25/28) . This is directly linked to a better precision of the analysis since modified variables in the lifted code are now accessible by EVA. In half the cases (11/20), we observe a precision gain on function return values. All in all, 31/34 (≈ 90%) functions with return or initial alarm show one of these two improvements.
The lifted C code also contains new alarms (13/58) which we could not detect before and should be taken into account (usually out-of-bounds or other memory accesses). For example, we have found one specific troubling alarm reported as an error in ffmpeg: the code can access index −1 of an input buffer. Even though this matter is acknowledged by ffmpeg developers in the source code, this shows that the lifted code retains enough precision to detect such fine details.
For short, we observe positive impact from TInA w.r.t. non-lifted code on 74% (43/58) of the functions (more precision, reducing alarms from over-approximations of inline assembly, or new memory alarms in lifted code) . Table 6 additionally shows the impact of the lifting strategy. Compared with basic lifting, full TInA increases the number of functions considered safe (no alarms), avoids halting the analysis, and reduces the overall number of produced alarms. Moreover, produced alarms are more precise: the aforementioned ffmpeg error is not found with basic lifting (EVA halts before).
Weakest precondition calculus. We use the deductive verification Frama-C WP [8, 17] plug-in. We take 12 assembly optimized functions (see Table 7 Table 2 . Timing for 2257 lifted chunks from the 4 key projects, 2 adapted from optimized assembly snippets and 4 translated examples from ACSL by example [14] . Loop invariants are manually inserted before verification, as usual for WP-based methods. Moreover, recall that assembly chunks are correctly over-approximated here by non-deterministic assignments to the modified C variables. Table 8 details our results. The unlifted code does not require invariants (no C-level loops), while codes obtained by basic lifting or TInA require identical invariants as they share the same control-flow structure. First, TInA allows the effective use of WP, proving the functional correctness of all functions (12/12) while WP without lifting always fails (0/12). Second, compared to basic lifting, TInA reduces the number of proof obligations (POs), sometimes significantly (up to ×16), but above all, it allows total verification by weakest precondition (12/12 vs 1/12), meaning that our implemented optimizations are absolutely necessary in this case.
Conclusion
The experiments reported in Sec. 7.1 and 7.2 show that our code lifting method is highly practical (100% Debian 8.11 in-scope blocks are lifted and validated), that it has a positive and significant impact on all 3 formal verification tools considered -allowing them to effectively handle code with inline assembly, and, finally, that full TInA is necessary to facilitate further code analysesas less refined lifting yields poorer analyses.
Discussion
Threats to validity
Benchmark representativeness. The code test base we consider is quantitatively and qualitatively representative of the use of inline assembly, as it is extensive and comprises highly popular and respected projects. We mainly experiment on GCC and x86, but preliminary experiments on ARM and clang (not reported here) show that results still hold in these settings. Still, we obviously miss closed-source software but also code which relies on Microsoft's C compiler (different assembly syntax). Yet, there is no reason to believe it would behave differently.
Verification methods. We consider three of the most popular verification techniques (symbolic execution, abstract interpretation and deductive verification), representative of the major classes of analysis -both in terms of goal (bug finding, runtime error checking and functional correctness proving) and underlying core technologies (domain propagation, constraint solving & path exploration, first-order reasoning). Also, we rely on well established verification tools, each applied in several successful industrial case studies. As such, we think that our experimental framework does support our generic claim on the verifiability of the codes produced by TInA.
Limitations
Our lifting shows two main limitations: hardware-related instructions and floating-point operations.
• Since our goal is to lift assembly chunks back to C, the support of hardware related instructions cannot be achieved outside of modeling hardware in C as well -for example, both DBA IR and C cannot make direct reference to hardware interrupts. Here we probably cannot do better than having two (approximated) C models of hardware instructions, one for over-approximations and one for under-approximations. While not necessarily that difficult for reasonable analysis precision, this is clearly a manpower-intensive task.
• The float limitation is primarily due to the lack of support in Binsec. Adding such support is manpowerintensive, but not that hard. Yet, the real issue is that efficient reasoning over floats is still ongoing scientific work in both program analysis and automated solvers (e.g., theory support is new in SMT-LIB [6] , only 2 solvers in the relevant category of SMT-COMP 2018). As such, it threatens our validation part, and most program analyzers would not be able to correctly handle these lifted floats anyway.
Recall that despite these limits, we still lift and validate 74% of assembly chunks of a standard Linux distribution. Finally, our technique is amenable, to a certain extent, to standalone assembly code or even binary code decompilation. However, this case can quickly deteriorate to the usual difficult problem of lifting an arbitrary program. Especially, dynamic jumps or large-size complicated CFG would probably yield serious issues.
Related Work
Assembly code lifting and verification. Maus [41, 42] proposes a generic method that simulates the behavior of assembly instructions in a virtual machine written in C. This work has been used during the Verisoft project to verify the code of an hypervisor consisting of mixed low-level code. Maus' technique relies on VCC [22] to write and prove verification conditions regarding the state of its machine. While we strive to produced high-level code, the produced virtual code contains all low-level code details, including flags.
Further work by Schmaltz and Shadrin [56] aims (only) at proving the ABI compliance of the assembly chunks. This method is however restricted to MASM and the Windows operating system. Our method, here applied to GCC inline assembly, is independent of the assembly dialect since it leverages binary level analyzers and is applicable to a wider range of architectures.
Fehnker et al. [31] tackle the analysis of inline assembly for ARM architecture, using a model-checking based syntactic analysis to integrate C/C ++ analyses with inline assembly. This solution is however limited by its purely syntactic basis: first, it is restricted to one single inline assembly dialect; second it loses the soundness properties we target. Losing soundness may be an appropriate practical trade-off, but not when aiming at further using sound formal analyses.
Corteggiani et al. [23] also use code lifting within their framework. However, their end goal is to perform dynamic symbolic analyses on the produced lifted code. Sec. 7.2 shows that such very targeted lifting may not be enough for other formal analyses. Moreover, the correction of the translation is not addressed.
Myreen et al. [46] targets verification of pure assembly code. The translation corresponds to our basic lifter, yet the approach proves the initial lifted IR is semantically equivalent to a very detailed ISA model. This paper then target verification at the level of assembly code but requires code annotations and interactive proving. Our proposal targets the lifting of inline assembly within C for (general) verification purposes, is geared at ensuring the verifiability of the produced code, and its validation establishes the correctness of the IR transformations producing the final extracted C code.
Decompilation. Decompilation [19] [20] [21] tackles the challenge of recovering the original source code (or a similar one) from an executable. This goal is very difficult and requires hard work to find back the information lost during compilation [18] . Despite significant recent progress [12] , decompilation remains an open challenge. Still, it is used to enhance program understanding, e.g., during reverse engineering. As such, correctness is not the main concern -for example it is not always necessary to produce compilable and valid source code. The notion of positive impact encompasses any of precision increase, alarm reductions and the addition of new alarms specific to the lifted C code. Table 6 . Impact of lifting strategies on EVA Soundness is addressed by two recent works. Schulte et al. [57] use search-based techniques to generate sourcecode producing byte-equivalent binaries to the original executable. This technique, when it succeeds, ensures soundness by design but it is only applied to small examples, with limited success. Brumley et al. [12] on the other hand use testing to increase trust in their lifted code.
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We do take inspiration from some decompilation techniques for type reconstruction [40, 55] . Even though we do not construct types that are not derived from inputs, it helps in strengthening our "type system".
A big challenge in decompilation consists in recovering the instructions set and CFG of the code under analysis [1, 43] . While this is a very hard problem in general (especially for adversarial codes such as malware), managed codes have much better regularity and patterns, and very good recovery can be achieved in practice [40] by unsound methods, yet without any guarantee. Inline assembly chunks have more limited behaviors (clear control-flow, no dynamic jumps); since here we also control compilation, this is not an issue.
Binary-level program analysis. For more than a decade now, the program analysis community has spent significant efforts on binary-level codes [2] , either to analyze source-less programs (malware, COTS) or to check the code that is really running. The efforts have mainly been concerned with safe high-level abstraction recovery [5, 29, 37, 52, 58] and invariant computation.
Several generic binary lifters have been produced [4, 11, 36] , reducing complex ISAs to a small set of semantically well-defined primitives. Though well tested [36] , more trust could be achieved if lifters were automatically derived from something akin to ARM's formal specifications [51] .
Mixed code problems. Morrisett et al. [44] have proposed Typed Assembly Language to ensure memory and control flow integrity in low-level assembly. Patterson et al. [50] have exploited the idea to mix low-level code with functional languages. We borrow some elements to propagate types between C and inline assembly.
Translation validation and code equivalence. In order to achieve safe lifting, we use translation validation [47, 54, 59 ], a technique also used in CompCert register allocation [10] . Our formal needs thus rely on well-established and -tested tools (here SMT solvers), usable as blackboxes, instead of a full formal proof of the whole lifting chain.
Program equivalence checking is considered a challenging verification task. Dedicated approaches start to emerge, for example relational weakest precondition calculus [9] (for proof) or relational symbolic execution [49] (for bug finding).
Conclusion
We have presented TInA, a method enabling the analysis of C/C ++ code mixed with inline assembly, by lifting the assembly chunks to equivalent C code. This method produces well-structured C code amenable to formal verification through a succession of transformation passes on an intermediate low-level representation lifted from the executable. To boot, this method provides a trustable translation through the use of translation validation. Thorough experiments on real-world
